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Abstract 
Purpose. Search for ways and their analysis to improve the safety of mining operations at coal mines in case of inadequate 
perception of risks or deliberate violation of occupational safety. 
Methods. An integrated approach is used in the work, which involves: analysis and generalization of previously performed 
research into the miners’ injuries during underground mining of minerals; analysis of the occupational safety management 
system; mathematical statistics methods; experiments planning in the questionnaires and expert groups development; expert 
assessment method. 
Findings. After analysis of the modern methods for the occupational safety system management, three main groups of fac-
tors leading to injury have been revealed. The ways to impact on injury factors are outlined. The objective of research has 
been formulated – identify the distinguishing features of the safety system at coal enterprises in case of inadequate percep-
tion of risks or deliberate violation of occupational safety, as well as development of the conceptual solutions to improve the 
safety system. A conceptual management graph has been created after summarizing the existing approaches to safety  
management. The actions have been analysed according to the developed graph through substitution into it of factors from 
the “staff-machine-environment” system during their pairwise interactions. The analysis of actions according to the safety 
management graph, performed by the reconstruction method indicates that the existing safety management system can be 
improved for specified conditions. It is proposed to improve the safety system by introducing a “smart-protection” system, 
which is triggered at the stage of hazards identification, increasing the decision-making adequacy. 
Originality. Improving the safety system in case of inadequate perception of risks or deliberate violation of occupational 
safety is achieved by introducing new sensors into the system, increasing the systems response speed, changing the principle 
of their operation, as well as improving installation schemes through analysis of devices, principles of processing infor-
mation and making decisions. 
Practical implications. The developed aerogas method of controlling the coal mines atmosphere can be used in case of 
inadequate perception of risks or deliberate violation of occupational safety. It complies with the proposed principles of 
“smart protection” and includes continuous monitoring for the mine atmosphere parameters. 
Keywords: rate of injuries, fatality, labour conditions safety, human factor, smart protection 
 
1. Introduction 
The rate of accidents in mining sector connected with fa-
talities, serious injuries and long-term disability is still the 
highest in the industry. At the same time, the state of the 
labour protection level remains unsatisfactory and does not 
comply with accepted social standards, despite the continu-
ous improvement and implementation of ever new measures 
and requirements of safety [1]-[4]. 
Despite the regular increase in the occupational safety 
costs, more than a thousand fatal injuries are recorded annu-
ally in the world mining sector. The main causes in mining 
casualty investigation reports or similar documents of other 
countries, are gas or dust explosions, gas poisoning, careless 
handling of explosives, electrocution, collapse of under-
ground structures, roof fall and collapse, flooding, people 
fall, mechanical injury by working equipment [5]-[9]. 
The world mining industry employs more than 40 million 
miners. The largest number of miners, about five million peo-
ple, are employed in the Chinese mining industry. Over the 
past 60 years, 250 thousand miners have died in China. For the 
recent years, the level of injuries there has gradually decreased 
from inadequately high to medium in relation to the global 
trend. For example, from 2002 to 2012 the number of fatal 
accidents decreased from 6995 to 1384. This is mainly condi-
tioned by an increase in the level of works mechanization. The 
main causes of fatal accidents in China are as follows: explo-
sions and fires – 43%; roof fall – 33%; mine workings flood-
ing – 8%; and coal transportation – 9% [10]-[13]. 
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The mines of Ukraine are among the most dangerous in 
the world, due to difficult mining-and-geological and tem-
perature conditions. Two-thirds of Ukrainian mines are of 
“excess-category” in methane content, a third – in coal dust 
content. In addition, their operation is affected by the domes-
tic coal industry technical backwardness [14]-[16]. 
As a result of the Ukrainian territory occupation in 2014 
that led to the armed conflict in the Donbass, the number of 
coal mines in Ukraine has decreased significantly. Since the 
beginning of 2019, the total number was 69 mines. Forty-two 
are state-owned mines. Of these, 31 mines are operating for 
extraction, 1 mine is at the stage of construction, 7 mines are 
being dissolved and 3 mines are operating in the mode of 
hydraulic protection. Twenty-seven mines are non-state 
mines. Therewith, the Donbass includes 33 mines operating 
in Donetsk region, 12 mines – in Lugansk region and 
10 mines – in Dnepropetrovsk region. The coal enterprises 
which are in the field of state supervision of labour protec-
tion and industrial safety of the State Labour Committee of 
Ukraine as of 01.01.2018, employ 100160 people.  
The mining industry is still one of the most dangerous in 
terms of fatal injury rate. To increase occupational safety 
performance, researchers and industry experts all over the 
world make a lot of efforts to identify the causes of accidents 
and improve the occupational safety control system [17]-[21]. 
2. Literature review 
Today, there is a common approach to safety research, 
which is based on the “staff-machine-environment” system 
analysis. Each industry is characterized by its own set of 
technological processes, which leads to various types of 
interactions in the specified system. The great hazardous 
factors variability, the specifics of labour conditions, produc-
tion management, the systems of control and punishment 
have led to the need for these factor types assignment. 
Though this simplifies the analysis of the accidents causes, in 
many cases it does not reveal the nature of the causes leading 
to them. The “typical definition” often hides the real cause of 
the accident or emergency case. Therefore, to develop sys-
tematic measures of injuries reduce, it is necessary to get a 
truthful pattern that has led to the accident. For this purpose, 
according to the author, it is necessary to discretize the caus-
es, based on the pair interactions study in the “staff-machine-
environment” system. Each interaction type requires discreti-
zation and development of appropriate measures. 
Recently, the greatest attention has been paid to the re-
search into the so-called “human factor”. Thus, it is proved in 
the Hinze [22], Haslam [23] studies that more than 70% of 
injuries are caused by workers’ hazardous activity, and prof. 
Rasmussen [24] believes that this parameter is 70-80%. An 
analysis of investigation reports in the domestic coal mining 
industry indicates that in the vast majority of them, the em-
ployee is guilty, who has got an injury [25]. 
According to the author, the “human factor” can be dif-
ferentiated into four groups: 
– safety violation reasoned by poor emotional and physi-
cal condition; 
– violation of safety rules or work technology due to lack 
of awareness of safe working methods; 
– deliberate violation of safety or work technology; 
– safety violation caused by non-recognition or delayed re-
sponse to hazard and underestimation of possible consequences. 
The injuries, according to the first group of factors, are 
reduced by introducing psychological methods, compliance 
with the requirements of industrial sanitation in the work-
place (lighting, noise, vibration), compliance with temporary 
labour standards and the like. Constant scientific research is 
carried out all over the world in this direction. In many coun-
tries, there are common standards and requirements for the 
maintenance of working places and labour conditions. The 
practice of analysing and accounting of the emotional condi-
tion when conducting instructions and making out work 
order is widespread in the world. Thus, the negative influ-
ence of the first factors group can be reduced by improving 
organizational and psychological measures. 
The activities against safety violations caused by a lack 
of employees awareness are constantly carried out at the 
mining enterprises. The regular training activities, retraining, 
instructions on labour protection, inspections, safety days, 
proving the accidents cases, as well as explaining the rea-
sons, and the like have been established by legislation. Vari-
ous methods of training in occupational safety are provided 
in the world, using both traditional and non-traditional ap-
proaches. The domestic mining industry constitutes no excep-
tion to this. In our country, there are high standards and legis-
lative acts of an international level. The negative influence of 
the second factors group can be reduced by improving at the 
enterprise of the labour protection services responsibility. 
Deliberate violation of safety or work technology is hard-
ly possible to predict or anticipate. It is extremely difficult to 
prevent such phenomena, since the motivational component 
of the personnel that allows for deliberate safety rules viola-
tion is uncertain, and it is difficult to determine the number 
and characteristics of such employees. Thus, the third group 
of factors is of heterogeneous and random nature. The reduc-
tion of these factors influence at the enterprises is performed 
mainly by increasing the personal responsibility of employ-
ees. The author does not diminish this approach importance 
and proposes the introduction of a “smart protection” system 
to reduce deliberate violations to nothing. This system should 
take into account the risks of deliberate violation of safety 
requirements and prevent them. 
The third factor of influence, unfortunately typical of the 
domestic industry, is not consistent with an international 
experience. For example, research conducted by prof. Ti-
xier [26] proves that the vast share of employees’ hazardous 
activity is not a deliberate safety violation, but is a result of 
poor hazard recognition and inadequate risk perception. 
Similar statistic data are presented by prof. Fang [27], ac-
cording to which the main reason for the majority of ob-
served hazardous behaviours is an inadequate understanding 
of hazards and risk perception among employees. 
It is hardly possible to draw such an unambiguous con-
clusion in view of the domestic mining industry, given the 
results of the mining casualty investigation [25]. Labour 
protection inspections annually record hundreds of violations 
at coal mines related to artificial deliberate shutdown, dam-
age, or breakdown of sensors and systems for monitoring the 
state of atmospheric air, electrical protection, and the like. 
Such violations are not specific to the European countries. 
It should be noted that a deliberate violation of safety 
requirements occurs when the offender underestimates  
the danger, therefore, an emergency or an accident seems 
unlikely to him. 
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The safety violations caused by non-recognition or de-
layed recognition of hazards can inherently be divided into 
two groups. The first group is related to insufficient employee 
experience, lack of skills to analyze the state of the working 
environment. Improving the skills and gaining the experi-
ence can be practiced through safety classes, instructing 
classes and surveys.  
There are several methods available to improve hazards 
recognition. These methods can usually be classified as: 
– predictive or retrospective in nature [28]-[30], which 
are based on a generalization of knowledge acquired as a 
result of incidents and injuries that have already occured, 
and their subsequent comparison with working situations in 
the workplace; 
– methods for predicting hazards, requiring from employ-
ees to mentally visualize tasks that will be completed in the 
near future and predicting expected hazards [31]; 
– other methods (safety instructions before performing 
the task, control of the knowledge level, etc.) [32]. 
The second group is related to the inadequacy of means 
for monitoring the technological processes state. Safety deci-
sions in certain situations are made by a rapid response to the 
registration results of work processes indicators, for example, 
the state of a mine atmosphere. The existing safety system 
should be improved in this regard. 
The purpose of this work is searching for ways and their 
analysis to improve the safety of mining operations at coal 
mines in case of inadequate perception of risks or deliberate 
violation of occupational safety. 
3. Methods 
Unfortunately, there is no tool today to directly identify 
the real causes of accidents and group them into pairs of 
interactions. Therefore, the expert assessment method is used 
in order to obtain such information. Based on the options of 
interaction in the “staff-machine-environment” system, the 
following three groups have been distinguished: 
– factors connected with hazards in the “human-
environment” system. Everything is done right by a man; 
– factors connected with hazards in the “human-machine” 
system; everything is done right by a man; 
– factors connected with the “human factor”; man be-
haves incorrectly. 
Experts are proposed to assess each factor weight by a 
10-point scale, thereby characterizing the share of its influ-
ence on the accident (indicator “probable cause”). 
The experts are the scientific and scientific-pedagogical 
staff members of leading industry research centers and uni-
versities of Ukraine with degrees of candidates and doctors 
of science, whose scientific interests are the issue of safety 
in mining operations; staff members of the mine technical 
inspection service, the State Inspectorate for Environmental 
and Technical Safety, Prosecutor staff members, mine engi-
neering service workers, representatives of supervision, 
labour protection services with at least 10 years of experi-
ence in the industry.  
The experts had an experience in the Donetsk region and 
in investigating the accidents at the coal mines of SE “Sely-
divvuhillia”, SE “Myrnohradugol”, LLC “DTEK Dobro-
pilliavugillia”, PJSC Mine Management “Pokrovske”. The 
technical and financial state of enterprises was different, 
therefore, the survey results were different, that only increas-
es the reliability of obtained results and the comprehensive-
ness of their analysis. About 89.7% of experts had an experi-
ence in mining casualty investigation. 
Number of factors n = 3. Number of experts m = 49. 
The concordance coefficient was adopted as a measure of 
consistency in experts’ assessments. After calculation, it was 
W = 1.77 which evidences a high degree of expert opinions 
consistency. In order of importance, the factors are grouped 
as follows (Table 1). 
Table 1. Grouping of factors in order of importance 
Factors Sum of ranks 
x1 “human-environment” 132.5 
x2 “human-machine” 140.5 
x3 “human factor” 241.5 
 
Among all the injuries, involved by “human factor”, by which 
we mean hazardous actions or inaction of employees under the 
dangerous factors influence, four groups can be distinguished: 
– safety violation caused by poor emotional and physical 
condition; 
– violation of safety or work technology due to a lack of 
awareness of safe working methods; 
– deliberate violation of safety or work technology; 
– safety violation caused by non-recognition or delayed re-
sponse to hazard and underestimation of possible consequences. 
Experts were also proposed to assess the weight of each 
four factors by a 10-point scale, thereby characterizing the 
share of its influence on the accident (indicator “probable 
cause”). Grouping of factors in order of importance is pre-
sented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Grouping of factors in order of importance 
Factors Sum of ranks 
x1 




“lack of awareness of safe 
working methods” 
203.0 
x3 “deliberate violation of safety” 240.5 
x4 
“non-recognition or delayed 
response to hazards” 
223.5 
4. Results and discussion 
Summary graph of expert assessments, grouped by fac-
tors, is given in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Graph of experts’ assessments, grouped by factors 
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The analysis indicates that the experts’ opinions regard-
ing the x4 factor influence (“non-recognition or delayed re-
sponse to hazards”) were the most consistent. The least con-
sistent assessments were x2 (“lack of awareness of safe work-
ing methods”). The range of assessments for factors x1 (“poor 
emotional and physical condition”), x3 (“deliberate violation 
of safety”) was the widest. It is interesting that a low assess-
ment on the latter factor was given by experts who were not 
directly involved in the accidents investigation, but only 
analyzed the investigation results. Personal experience, spe-
cific labour conditions, and various professional responsibili-
ties explain such large values in the results difference. Thus, 
the expert assessments analysis shows that the results can be 
used in further analysis. 
Safety management is one of the most popular research 
trends of occupational safety area in different countries. 
There are various approaches to assessing risks, the level of 
acceptable risks, and the probable or stochastic nature of 
accidents. After summarizing the existing approaches to 
safety management, the author has developed a conceptual 
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Figure 2. Safety management graph 
Factors x3 and x4 can be generalized by the block “possi-
ble consequences are underestimated” of the safety manage-
ment graph. An example of such course of events, for the 
hazard factor “methane gas explosion” as a result of “disor-
der” in the methane control sensors operation, according to 
the author, is characterized by the parameter “deliberate 
violation of safety”, which is shown in Figure 3. 
The scheme illustrates the reconstruction of the accident 
at the Novodonetsk mine of 06/12/2017, in the 3rd northern 
longwall face of the stepline slope No. 1 of the seam l3. The 
circumstances of the accident are given in detail in [33]. 
A methane ignition occurred at 9.05 p.m. in the upper 
part of the 3rd northern longwall face of the stepline slope 
No. 1 of the seam l3, and, as a result of which, workers have 
received burns of varying severity. 
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Figure 3. Safety management graph with parameter “deliberate 
violation of safety” (scheme illustrates the reconstruction 
of the accident at the Novodonetsk mine of 06/12/2017) 
Therefore, the 10th squad of the State Militarized Mine-
Rescue Service was called up for the “explosion” type of 
accident in accordance with the established procedure. 
On the day of the accident 06/12/2017, according to the 
diagram, from 2 to 9 p.m., the indicators of methane content 
ranged within 0.5% with slight deviations. Later, in the peri-
od from 9 to 10 p.m., the methane content increased to 
0.75%, and about 10 p.m., there was a sharp increase in me-
thane concentration to 2.5%, and then from 10 to 10.30 p.m., 
a methane concentration increased up to 3.1%. These data 
were until 12 a.m. of the next day (06/13/2017). 
The methane concentration sensor D2i-1, according to the 
AGC (automatic gas control) project, should have been 
placed on the outcoming jet at 10-20 m from the longwall 
face window in the 3rd north upper entry of the stepline 
slope No. 1 and adjusted for the actuation setpoint at 1.3%. 
On the day of the accident 06/12/2017, the sensor readings 
from 2 to 9 p.m. were stable at the level of 0.6% methane 
concentration. At 9 p.m., after a slight drop, the readings 
decreased to 0.4% and up to 10.15 p.m. – to 0.3% methane 
concentration. At 4 a.m., the readings slightly increased to 
0.4% and subsequently remained at the same level. 
The methane concentration sensor DZi-1, according to 
the AGC project, was located at the reclaimed blind corner in 
the 3rd north upper entry and adjusted for the actuation set-
point at 2%. On the day of the accident 06/12/17, from 2 to 
9 p.m., the sensor readings were at the level of 0.75% me-
thane concentration with small deviations. Then, after a 
slight decrease at 9.45 p.m., there was a sharp increase in 
concentration up to 10.15 p.m., reaching the level of 2.3%, 
and at 10.18 p.m. the sensor turned off and its readings were 
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subsequently zero. The actual arrangement of the sensors 
D2i-1 and DZi-1 methane concentration has not been deter-
mined by the commission. 
The mine workings at the emergency site were exam-
ined by members of the special investigation commission, 
the expert commission and mine workers from 12.30 to 
6.20 p.m. of 06/23/2017. 
The squad of the State Militarized Mine-Rescue Service, 
which examined the emergency longwall face, has taken air 
samples. The gas situation, identified at 3.10 a.m. by express 
method in the area of upper connection (section No. 166) was 
as follows: СН4 = 1.1%; СО = 0.0%; in the blind corner –  
СН4 = 2.2%; СО = 0.0%. 
It turns out that at the time of the explosion during the 
longwall face operation, the methane concentration was 
lower than during the examination after the longwall face 
was stopped. 
Obviously, a methane explosion could not occur with the 
concentrations indicated on the sensors. Moreover, the me-
thane sensor D2i-1, located at a distance of 20-30 m from the 
place of explosion, has not recorded a single increase in me-
thane concentration either during the accident or after that. 
This can only mean that the sensor was not operating in nor-
mal mode. The methane concentration sensor DZi-1 untill 
9.45 p.m., that is, for additional 40 minutes after the accident, 
showed 0.75% methane concentration, and then the readings 
increased sharply to 2.3%, after which the sensor turned off. 
This can only mean that at the time of the accident the sensor 
did not show accurate information, it was either covered, or 
set in another place. It is evidenced by a sharp increase in the 
sensor readings at 9.45 p.m., when it was probably set in the 
appropriate position according to the AGC project. 
These two sensors, according to the author, were deliber-
ately made “sluggish”. As for the DZi-1 sensor, although it 
has recorded concentrations that are up to 3 times higher than 
the permissible Industrial Safety concentrations, but they 
were obviously delayed by at least 30 minutes, which cannot 
but cause questions. 
In the above example, the fact that the hazard was iden-
tified, but underestimated can be asserted based on the fact, 
that the methane content in the longwall face should have 
been monitored using the episodic mining device by the 
mining master of the mining site, as well as using the de-
vices of continuous operation by the miners at the upper 
connection and by the operator of rock removing machines 
on the mining combine. 
The case given as an example is not an isolated one. Un-
fortunately, during the investigation, it is extremely rare 
possible to establish the real facts of unauthorized tampering 
with the operation of aerogas protection systems. But such 
suspicions of the investigation commissions and expert 
groups arise periodically. As an example can be the I catego-
ry accident that occurred on March 2, 2017 at 12.05 a.m. at 
the Stepova Mine of the SE “Lvivvuhillia” – methane-air 
mixture explosion that occurred in the belt entry No. 119 in 
the area from 0 to 50 m from the longwall face. The authors 
of work [34], devoted to the details of the accident at the 
Stepova Mine, point out as the main problems “the main 
reasons for obtaining data that are not true: a problem with 
the power supply; incorrect adjustment and arrangement of 
control sensors; loss of connection with the server; instabil-
ity of the ventilation system; repair operations with the 
control system; the absence of air velocity sensors at the 
locations of methane control sensors, as well as unautho-
rized tampering with the system and other factors”. In the 
work [35], it is noted that accidents by drilling and blasting 
works (DBW) at gassy mines can bring about larger trage-
dies because of the gas-dynamic phenomenon, e.g. gas 
explosion caused by the local strata congestion at 
A.F. Zasiadko mine on June 31, 2002. 
The main reasons of accidents and injuries caused by  
explosives at mines are: 
– unauthorized conduction of blasting operations or vio-
lation of their DBW certificates; 
– blasting works in the presence of people in the dan-
gerous zone; 
– use of such explosives at coal mines that do not comply 
with safety grade; 
– carrying out DBW by the staff without the appropriate 
qualifications or the right to conduct such works. 
The analysis shows that over 80% of accidents in indus-
try are caused by administrative reasons and only 20% are 
associated with violation of the DBW certificates. 
The indicated 80% may be interpreted as a deliberate vio-
lation of safety. 
The performed analysis testifies that the existing safety 
management system can be improved to account for “delib-
erate violation of safety”. 
The peculiarity of underestimating the hazard is that 
there are situational and subjective factors that are difficult 
to predict. Moreover, the control system, designed for ade-
quacy and constancy of the response, which in fact is not 
stochastically determined. Improving the safety system for 
such factors is proposed by introducing a “smart protec-
tion” block that is actuated at the stage of hazard detection, 
increasing the decision-making adequacy. The discretiza-
tion of the process improves the protection quality. An 
example of such a safety management scheme implementa-
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Figure 4. Safety management graph, improved for hazards that 
can be parameterized as “deliberate violation of safety” 
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In practice such a system is possible to implement by in-
troducing additional elements, sensors, increasing the systems 
response speed, changing the principle of their operation, 
improving installation schemes through analysis of devices, 
principles of processing information and making decisions. 
An example of the practical implementation of the above 
approach is the aerogas control method of the mine atmos-
phere developed by the author [36]. 
The basis for the developed solution is the task of im-
proving the aerogas control method of the mine atmosphere, 
by means of which it is possible to detect “unauthorized 
tampering” with the system operation by setting additional 
control elements. This “unauthorized tampering” is repre-
sented by restricting the methane-air mixture penetration into 
the sensor reaction camera and changing the sensors position 
in space at any stage of operation. These measures would 
prevent the occurrence of increased methane concentrations 
in the mine atmosphere and the threat of methane explosions 
and ignitions. 
The problem is solved in such a way, that in the devel-
oped method of aerogas control of the mine atmosphere, 
which includes continuous monitoring of the composition 
and parameters of the atmosphere in the mines, hazardous in 
gas and dust, rock blows and sudden emissions, an increase 
in the information content in operating the system of aerogas 
control of the atmosphere, in accordance with the invention 
of increasing the information content in operating the system 
of aerogas control of the atmosphere, is performed by fixing 
the mechanical restriction of methane-air mixture penetration 
into the reaction camera of the methane control sensors by 
setting at least one additional optical emitter with beams 
focused on the methane control sensor camera, in which 
there is an optical receiver with a recording sensor. Infor-
mation from the sensor is transmitted to the control and 
alarm system, which detects an unauthorized change in space 
of methane control sensors position by setting at least one 
optical distance sensor with the beams focused on the dis-
tance change controller housing, the information from which 
is transmitted to the control and alarm system. 
It is expedient to perform the additional setting of an op-
tical emitter with beams focused on the methane control 
sensor camera, in which an optical receiver with a recording 
sensor is installed at a distance of 0.1-1.0 m from the latter. 
And an optical distance sensor with the beams focused on the 
distance change controller, from which information is trans-
mitted to the control and alarm system to prevent “unauthor-
ized tampering” with the system operation by fixing the 
changes in space of methane control sensors position, should 
be set at a distance of 1.0 – 5.0 m. 
It is expedient, when setting an optical emitter with the 
beams focused on the methane control sensor camera, in 
which an optical receiver is set with a recording sensor, to 
provide for kinematic connection with the corresponding 
methane control sensor. 
Increasing the information content in operating the sys-
tem of aerogas control of the atmosphere by fixing the me-
chanical restriction of methane-air mixture penetration into 
the methane control sensors camera with additional setting of 
at least one optical emitter with beams focused on the me-
thane control sensor camera, in which an optical receiver is 
set with a recording sensor and information from which is 
transmitted to the control and alarm system, makes possible 
to detect an “unauthorized tampering” in the form of restric-
ting the methane-air mixture penetration into the sensor  
camera at any stage of the system operation. When unautho-
rized blocking of methane-air mixture access to the methane 
sensor camera occurs, the optical contact between the emitter 
and receiver is broken, fixed by the recording sensor and, 
through the control and alarm system an unauthorized tam-
pering is notified. That way, an “unauthorized tampering” is 
detected at any stage of the system operation in the form of 
restricting the methane-air mixture penetration into the me-
thane control sensor camera. This, in turn, prevents the oc-
currence of increased gas concentrations and the threat of 
methane explosions and ignitions. 
Fixing of an unauthorized change in space of methane 
control sensors position by additional setting in them at least 
one optical distance sensor with the beams focused on the 
distance change controller housing, the information from 
which is transmitted to the control and alarm system, makes 
possible to detect an “unauthorized tampering” in the form 
of changing in space of the sensors position at any stage of 
the system operation. In case of unauthorized methane con-
trol sensor displacement in space, the distance between it 
and the distance change controller housing is changed, 
which is recorded by the sensor and notified through the 
control and alarm system about an unauthorized tampering. 
That way, an “unauthorized tampering” is detected at any 
stage of the system operation in the form of changing in 
space of the methane control sensors position at any stage 
of the system operation. This, in turn, prevents the occur-
rence of increased gas concentrations and the threat of gas 
explosions and ignitions. 
Setting of an optical emitter with beams focused on the 
methane control sensor camera, in which an optical receiver 
with a recording sensor is set at a distance of 0.1-1.0 m from 
the latter, allows reliable control of the optical contact. When 
increasing this distance by more than 1.0 m in a dust mine 
atmosphere, the contact will be unstable due to dust flow, 
and this will contribute to a large number of signals with an 
error. If the distance between the sensors is less than 0.1 m, 
the recording sensor will obstruct natural movement of air 
and the methane-air mixture penetration into the reaction 
camera of the methane control sensor. 
Setting of an optical distance sensor with the beams fo-
cused on the distance change controller, from which infor-
mation is transmitted to the control and alarm system at a 
distance of 1.0-5.0 m allows reliable monitoring of the dis-
tance between the sensors and, accordingly, to detect an 
unauthorized change in space of methane control sensor 
position. When the distance between the sensor and the con-
troller is less than 1.0 m, there is a technical possibility of 
synchronous relocation of the sensor and controller within 
mine dimensions in order to avoid fixing of tampering with 
the system. When the distance between the sensor and the 
controller is more than 5.0 m, the distance measurements 
accuracy decreases, which requires an improvement in the 
distance fixation quality and may lead to an unreasonable 
increase in the cost of the system. 
Setting of an optical emitter with beams focused on the 
methane control sensor camera, in which an optical receiver 
is set with a recording sensor, kinematically connected with 
the corresponding methane control sensor, enables to in-
crease the system reliability and reduce the number of false 
alarms. This method is presented in Figure 5. 




Figure 5. Method for aerogas control of the mine atmosphere:  
1 – mine working; 2 – methane control sensor;  
3 – stationary equipment of automatic gas control;  
4 – telemetry pedestal; 5 – recording sensor with an op-
tical receiver; 6 – distance change controller 
The method is implemented as follows. In mine wor-
kings 1, the methane control sensors 2 are being installed. In 
case of exceeding the maximum permissible gas concentra-
tion, the AGZ 3 command is given to turn off the power 
supply in the longwall face. Control engineers receive tele-
measurements through the telemetry pedestal 4. In the case 
of “unauthorized tampering” with the system operation by 
mechanical blocking of the methane-air mixture penetration 
into the reaction camera of the sensor 2, the optical contact 
between the emitter and the optical receiver of the recording 
sensor 5 is broken. Information about “unauthorized tamper-
ing” is transmitted to the control engineer through pedestal 4 
and the control and alarm system is triggered. In the case of 
“unauthorized tampering” with the system operation by 
changing the position of the methane control sensors 2 in 
space, the distance between the distance sensor built into the 
methane sensor 2 and the distance controller 6 is changed. 
This is recorded by the system and information about “unau-
thorized tampering” is transmitted to the control engineer 
through pedestal 4, and the control and alarm system is trig-
gered. This allows to detect an “unauthorized tampering” at 
any stage of the system operation and prevent the occurrence 
of increased methane concentrations in the mine atmosphere, 
as well as the threat of methane explosions and ignitions. 
The implementation of the proposed aerogas control 
method of the mine atmosphere by setting a “smart protec-
tion” system, which includes additional control elements, is 
achieved by the possibility of fixing “unauthorized tampe-
ring” with the system at any stage of its operation, which 
helps to prevent the formation of explosive concentrations of 
dust-gas mixture and the possibility of its explosions. 
5. Conclusions 
An analysis of the existing labour safety management 
system indicates that in order to improve the miners’ opera-
tion safety in the domestic mining industry, the labour safety 
system should be improved in case of inadequate perception 
of risks or deliberate violation of occupational safety. 
Improving the safety system of above conditions is pro-
posed by introducing into the system additional elements, 
sensors, increasing the systems response speed, changing the 
principle of their operation, improving installation schemes 
through analysis of devices, principles of processing infor-
mation and making decisions. 
A method of aerogas control of the mine atmosphere devel-
oped by the author is presented, which includes the proposed 
“smart protection” system and additional control elements. In 
addition, it is possible to record an “unauthorized tampering” 
with the system at any stage of its operation. Improving the 
safety system at coal mining enterprises is an important sci-
entific task, which will be the subject of further research. 
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Удосконалення системи управління безпекою гірничих підприємств України 
Б. Кобилянський, А. Михальченко 
Мета. Пошук і аналіз шляхів удосконалення безпеки робіт на вугільних шахтах при неадекватному сприйнятті ризиків або на-
вмисному порушенні безпеки робіт. 
Методика. У роботі використано комплексний підхід, що включає: аналіз і узагальнення раніше виконаних досліджень травма-
тизму гірників при підземному видобуванні корисних копалин; аналіз системи управління безпекою праці; методи математичної 
статистики; планування експериментів при розробці опросних листів та експертних груп; метод експертних оцінок. 
Результати. Проаналізовано сучасні методи управління системою безпеки праці, визначені три основні групи чинників, що 
призводять до травмування. Намічено шляхи впливу на фактори травматизму. Сформульовано завдання дослідження – виявлення 
характерних рис системи безпеки вугільних підприємств при неадекватному сприйнятті ризиків або навмисному порушенні безпе-
ки робіт і розробка концептуальних рішень з удосконалення системи безпеки. Створено концептуальний граф управління після 
узагальнення існуючих підходів до управління безпекою. Проведено аналіз дій по розробленому графу при підстановці в нього 
факторів з системи “персонал – машина – середовище” при їх парних взаємодіях. Проведений аналіз дій по графу управління без-
пекою методом реконструкції свідчить, що існуюча система управління безпекою може бути удосконалена для визначених умов. 
Пропонується удосконалення системи безпеки вести за рахунок введення системи “смарт-захисту”, яка спрацьовує на етапі іденти-
фікації небезпек, підвищуючи адекватність прийняття рішень. 
Наукова новизна. Удосконалення системи безпеки при неадекватному сприйнятті ризиків або навмисному порушенні безпеки 
робіт досягається шляхом введення в систему нових датчиків, підвищення швидкості реагування систем, зміни принципу їх роботи, 
удосконалення схем встановлення аналізуючих пристроїв та принципів обробки інформації і прийняття рішень. 
Практична значимість. Розроблено спосіб аерогазового контролю атмосфери вугільних шахт, що може використовуватись 
при неадекватному сприйнятті ризиків або навмисному порушенні безпеки робіт, відповідає запропонованим принципам “смарт-
захисту” і включає безперервний моніторинг параметрів шахтної атмосфери. 
Ключові слова: травматизм, смертельний травматизм, безпека умов праці, людський фактор, смарт-захист 
Совершенствование системы управления безопасностью горных предприятий Украины 
Б. Кобылянский, А. Михальченко 
Цель. Поиск и анализ путей совершенствования безопасности работ на угольных шахтах при неадекватном восприятии рисков 
или умышленном нарушении безопасности работ. 
Методика. В работе использован комплексный подход, включающий: анализ и обобщение ранее выполненных исследований 
травматизма горняков при подземной добыче полезных ископаемых; анализ системы управления безопасностью труда; методы мате-
матической статистики; планирования экспериментов при разработке опросных листов и экспертных групп; метод экспертных оценок. 
Результаты. Проанализированы современные методы управления системой безопасности труда, определены три основные 
группы факторов, приводящих к травме. Намечены пути воздействия на факторы травматизма. Сформулирована задача исследова-
ния – выявление характерных особенностей системы безопасности угольных предприятий при неадекватном восприятии рисков 
или умышленном нарушении безопасности работ и разработка концептуальных решений по совершенствованию системы безопас-
ности. Создан концептуальный граф управления после обобщения существующих подходов к управлению безопасностью. Прове-
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ден анализ действий по разработанному графу при подстановке в него факторов из системы “персонал – машина – среда” при их 
парных взаимодействиях. Проведенный анализ действий по графу управления безопасностью методом реконструкции свидетель-
ствует, что существующая система управления безопасностью может быть усовершенствована для определенных условий. Пред-
ложено совершенствование системы безопасности вести за счет введения системы “смарт-защиты”, которая срабатывает на этапе 
идентификации опасностей, повышая адекватность принятия решений. 
Научная новизна. Совершенствование системы безопасности при неадекватном восприятии рисков или умышленном наруше-
нии безопасности работ достигается путем введения в систему новых датчиков, повышения скорости реагирования систем, измене-
ния принципа их работы, совершенствования схем установки анализирующих устройств, принципов обработки информации и 
принятия решений. 
Практическая значимость. Разработан способ аэрогазового контроля атмосферы угольных шахт, который может использо-
ваться при неадекватном восприятии рисков или умышленном нарушении безопасности работ, соответствует предложенным прин-
ципам “смарт-защиты” и включает непрерывный мониторинг параметров шахтной атмосферы. 
Ключевые слова: травматизм, смертельный травматизм, безопасность условий труда, человеческий фактор, смарт-защита 
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